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In an early 1998 interview, playwright, Paula Vogel, sat in conversation with Arthur 
Holmberg to discuss the ambivalent victim-perpetrator power dynamics in her critically-
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Bit. Li’l Bit as an adult looking at and understanding her complicity.” Since the Holmberg 
interview, critics have made only passing references to Vogel’s discussion of complicity in play 
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as an ethical subject to argue that Li’l Bit’s dependence upon her uncle for emotional and 
sometimes physical survival exempts her from moral scrutiny in the course of his abuse.  
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1 “SHE’S A SLY ONE:” RE-THINKING COMPLICITY AND SURVIVAL IN 
PAULA VOGEL’S HOW I LEARNED TO DRIVE  
In January of 2018, Judge Rosemary Aquilina sentenced Larry Nassar to up to 175 years 
in prison, telling him, “I just signed your death warrant” (Cacciola and Mather). Nassar, a 
pedophile and former osteopathic physician, was recruited by the USA Gymnastics team as 
national medical coordinator in 1996 where he used his position to sexually abuse over 150 
children and adolescents until 2014 (Hauser and Zraik). In court, Nassar shook his head when his 
accusers spoke, charging them with public attention-seeking, and writing in a single-spaced, six-
page-long letter to the court, “I was a good doctor because my treatments worked. The same ones 
speaking out now came back to me and referenced friends and family…Hell hath no fury like a 
woman scorned” (Cacciola and Mather). When Judge Aquilina read this last line aloud, the 
attendant victims and their families gasped in surprise and shook their heads in disgust. Many of 
Nassar’s victims had been less than ten years old when he abused them. 
Nassar’s trial—and especially that moment of victim-perpetrator tension in Nassar’s 
trial—represents in some ways the recent changes to public discourse surrounding sexual 
violence. Nassar was not, after all, the only figure under public scrutiny in recent years, but was 
rather one of over 250 high-profile figures named for sexual misconduct as a result of the MeToo 
Movement (Corey). In 2006, civil rights activist Tarana Burke launched the Me Too movement 
and, in 2016, actress, Alyssa Milano, drew attention to Burke’s work by asking her own Twitter 
followers to reply to a tweet with the words “me too” if they had ever been sexually harassed or 
assaulted (Chan). In the responses that followed the post, many women would come forward to 
launch allegations of sexual misconduct against high-profile men like Harvey Weinstein, Matt 
Lauer, Kevin Spacey, and Louis CK (Corey). In theater and performance studies, other men and 
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women launched other allegations (and lawsuits) in an effort to hold artistic and technical 
directors accountable for sexually abusive behavior (Tran et al). 
In this introduction, I build upon this transparency and activism by reading Paula Vogel’s 
How I Learned to Drive in the context of changes in public discourse that have been generated as 
a result of the MeToo Movement. In particular, I situate my reading in recent discussions 
surrounding two subjects: complicity and blame (in chapter one), and survival and victimhood 
(in chapter two). In this section, I establish an ethical framework for the kinds of theoretical 
questions that emerge in philosophical analyses of complicity and blame. I provide an overview 
of Saba Bazargan-Forward’s three methods of analyzing complicity with particular attention to 
Christopher Kutz’s writings on joint-action complicity. Because all three methods of analyzing 
complicity are primarily designed without children or adolescents in mind, I supplement my 
reading of Kutz with David Kennedy’s writings on childhood identity formation as well as other 
psychoanalytic writings on child sexual abuse. My aim in this reading is not to infantilize Li’l Bit 
nor to minimize Peck’s influence in her life, but rather to raise questions about what critics are 
meaning when they talk about the “fraught” question of complicity in Drive (Smalec 589). 
Ultimately, I demonstrate how this blameworthiness or complicity is bound up in Li’l Bit’s 
dependency upon Peck in a way that exempts her from full participation in what Kutz calls “the 
accountability system” (48).  
While I primarily examine the power dynamics surrounding Li’l Bit’s experience of 
victimization in chapter one, I dedicate the second chapter to charting her transition from victim 
of trauma to survivor of trauma. In chapter two, I situate the notion of trauma survival in Robin 
James’ writings on feminist narratives of resilience and Vogel’s early interview discussion of the 
“gifts we receive from the people who hurt us” (Holmberg 436). In revisiting these gifts, I 
3 
account for Li’l Bit’s survival in view of her own flexibility and creativity towards Peck’s self-
destructive coping skills rather than Peck’s lessons or Peck himself. At the end of this chapter, I 
make a distinction between survival and healing in order to evaluate, not merely Li’l Bit’s escape 
from Peck, but the resources that allow her to maintain that physical and emotional separation. 
Over the course of this essay, I analyze complicity and survival in Drive to demonstrate 
how Li’l Bit survives in spite of Peck’s abuse, and not because of it. To this end, I hope to 
absolve Li’l Bit of any responsibility for Peck’s crimes while providing a theoretical and textual 
framework for the interpretation one recent Drive actor offered when she said that “sexual abuse 
happens in ways that compels the victim to protect the predator. Sometimes the victim doesn’t 
recognize what has happened is abuse until years later. Sometimes love is involved…and this 
doesn't excuse [abuse], but it does confuse it” (Kloster). In this thesis, I offer Peck no protection 
for his confusion and crimes and no platform for his project of erasure. In doing so, I hope to 
build upon the work of other Me Too activists by returning blame where blame is due, to play 
and real world perpetrators like Peck, Larry Nassar, R. Kelly, and Jeffrey Epstein who shoulder 
the pipe dreams of young girls in order to abuse them.  
1.1 Complicity and Knowing: Reading Drive in the #Metoo Era  
In 2017, a writer for the website Dictionary.com declared complicit to be the word of the 
year, explaining that it had “sprung up in conversations...about those who speak out against 
powerful figures and institutions and about those who stay silent” (“Dictionary.com’s 2017”). 
While the connotations in the website’s definition of the word—“involved with others in an illegal 
activity or wrongdoing”—have no precise relationship with knowledge or privilege, the writers 
comments certainly do (“Dictionary.com’s 2017”). In this instance, the language of “staying 
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silent,” has all of the moral weight of John Stuart Mill’s oft-cited idea that “Bad men need nothing 
more to compass their ends, than that good men should look on and do nothing” (74). In Los 
Angeles, an artist accused Meryl Streep of this kind of complicit silence with Harvey Weinstein, 
superimposing the phrase “she knew” in a Barbara Kruger-inspired inspired font over a poster-
sized photo of the actress (Paiella). On Saturday Night Live, Scarlett Johannson performed in a 
sketch as Ivanka Trump, promoting a new fragrance line called Complicit for the woman who 
“knows who she is and what she’s doing” and “who could stop all this, but won’t” (“Complicit”). 
With both Streep and Ivanka Trump, complicity has the connotation of what Carina Chocano has 
recently written in the New York Times as “a moral (non) stance that clears the way for everything 
from bad manners to genocide” (Chocano).     
While I will return to the relationship between knowledge and complicity in this section, 
I will first distinguish between the three primary methods of analyzing complicity, which 
philosopher and ethical theorist Saba Bazargan-Forward has described as the “problem of 
marginal contributions” (327). Bazargan-Forward begins his book chapter, “Complicity,” by 
defining the “juristic” approach to the problem of marginal contributions that “adverts to the 
theoretical grounds for complicity in the law” (327). Because I am evaluating Li'l Bit's moral 
complicity, the juristic approach has little bearing on this essay aside from the legal notion of 
“mens rea” as it relates to questions of intentionality in moral wrong-doing. In a “group-agency” 
analysis, Bazargan-Forward “locates complicity in the individuals who together compose a group 
agent” (328). Philip Pettit explains how group unity necessarily “binds the attitudes of the 
collectivity at any time and across different times,” in a way that “cannot be smoothly continuous 
with the corresponding attitudes of [individual] members” (184). Putting this notion to work, 
Margaret Gilbert writes of a family member, Betty, who “might oppose [the] wishes [of 
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individuals in her family so that]...all she needs to do to exit the larger collective in question is to 
leave a particular geographical area” (79). In speaking to issues of survival and dependency, 
however, Gilbert describes how relationships to the family—to a smaller units within a larger 
collective—may make such departure impossible. Betty may “have little money, and several 
young children to care for” so that while she may say that the tribe “is to blame” for the 
behaviors that she “might oppose,” she herself bears no personal moral responsibility (79). While 
Gilbert’s method of analyzing complicity is better suited for analyses of collective agency rather 
than Peck’s relationship with Li’l Bit, her example of Betty and her small children speaks to a 
power dynamic that emerges in all three methods of complicity—that is, that dependents 
(children, people who cannot support themselves) are held to different standards of 
accountability than adults. 
Theorists who analyze blameworthiness through a method of joint-action complicity 
provide more specific standards regarding how we ought to account for such relationships of 
dependency. Bazargan defines joint-action complicity as “the shared actions and intentions of 
individuals engaged in a cooperative product” (328). One theorist, Seumas Miller, frames the 
theory in an art gallery robbery, writing, “Burglar A might be individually morally responsible 
for turning off the security system...burglar B individually morally responsible for smashing the 
glass shield protecting the work of art. However, A and B are jointly morally responsible for the 
theft of the work of art” for “realizing this collective end” (242).  
Arriving at that collective end, however, Christopher Kutz has stipulations towards what 
he calls the “multiplicity of relations among agents” in a moral system as structured by 
“participatory” relationships. Speaking more directly to Gilbert’s notion of dependency, Kutz 
evaluates the moral accountability of children and adolescents who “are treated as not 
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responsible and hence not accountable for serious harms” (50). Drawing on Peter Strawson's 
argument in Freedom and Resistance, he bases this limited accountability on our “awareness of 
cognitive and affective limitations in non-responsible agents naturally precludes them from 
participating in the relationships characteristic of adult society” (50). The blamelessness of these 
“immature agents” Kutz explains, “lies in the relationship the respondent has with the agent, 
namely objective rather than participatory” (50). 
To summarize these theorists, analyses of complicity (legal or otherwise) generally 
account for both intentionality and issues of dependency in moral decision-making, especially as 
that decision-making relates to children and adolescents. Returning to the 2017 writing of 
complicity as a “(non) stance,” towards privileged knowledge then, I argue in chapter one that 
Li’l Bit’s relationship with Peck—as both his student and his underage niece—exempts her from 
Kutz’s accountability system. In doing so, I both counter Aunt Mary’s claim that Li’l Bit “knows 
exactly what she’s doing” while demonstrating how Li’l Bit’s knowledge and agency is 
continually compromised by and bound up in her dependency upon Peck’s authority (Vogel 67). 
1.2 Survival and Victimhood: Feminism and Resilience  
In chapter two, I examine—not Li’l Bit’s dependency upon Peck—but her path towards 
independence, from victim of trauma to survivor of trauma. Such rhetorical distinctions between 
trauma victims and trauma survivors have their roots in longer-standing traditions by second-
wave writers. Kathleen Barry, for example, writes in Female Sexual Slavery of “victimism [as] a 
status assigned to [victims] by those who are judging [their] experience[s]” (46). Victims may 
characterized with a “passivity in accepting the noninteractive role of victim—the simple object 
of abuse” (46). Surviving “is the other side of being a victim,” as it requires “will, action, [and] 
initiative” in order to cope with or overcome sexual violence (46). While Li’l Bit is never merely 
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a passive object of Peck’s abuse, I illustrate—in chapter one—how her dependency upon Peck’s 
authority ultimately undermines her efforts to overpower him.  
In chapter two, I evaluate the conditions and resources that Li’l Bit looks to in order to end  
her relationship of dependency with Peck in the context of  Robin James’ writings on feminism 
and resilience. Though James situates her theory in more complicated analyses of neoliberal 
military policy, she simplifies her writing in the way of feminism by gesturing to what she refers 
to as a therapeutic narrative. In that narrative trajectory, women are damaged by crises and 
misogyny, but they use this damage to become self-aware survivors. In Li’l Bit’s narrative, I read 
what Vogel identifies as Peck’s “gifts” of survival as resources of Li’l Bit’s own imagination 
(Holmberg 436). Specifically, I evaluate the mind-body alienation that Li’l Bit inherits from Peck 
and that compromises nearly every other gift he gives her in the way of emotional support. 
Ultimately, I demonstrate how towards a process of healing that Peck himself never teaches her.  
1.3  Review of Literature 
In evaluating the victim-perpetrator dynamics between Li’l Bit and her Uncle, many critics 
have turned to psychoanalytic frameworks of analysis in view of the chronology of Drive and the 
notion of traumatic latency. Andrea J. Nouryeh, for example, reads the play’s chronology—the 
flashing-back and flashing-forward—as a representation of the PTSD flashbacks that Jennifer 
Freyd describes in her work on memory and betrayal. Nouryeh writes that these 
“flashbacks…surface randomly, moving back and forth in time” (56). Though Graley Herren 
pushes back against the literalism of Nouryeh’s psychoanalysis1, he also looks to both the DSM-
III definition of PTSD as well as Cathy Caruth’s writings on “powerlessness and belatedness,” to 
argue that Li’l Bit is a “post-victim” and “active choreographer of her own memories from the 
 
1 Herren describes Nouryeh’s reading as the “psychosexual equivalent of a bad acid trip” (106). 
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play’s beginning” (106). In chapter two, I touch briefly on Herren’s argument surrounding the 
“healing capacity of theater” to evaluate Li’ l Bit’s development from trauma victim to trauma 
survivor in the community outside of her family’s influence.   
Both V.B Lipscomb and Joanna Mansbridge read the play’s chronology as a means of 
evaluating Li’l Bit’s past and present subjectivity. Lipscomb, then, evaluates Vogel’s chronology 
through the work of age theorist, Margaret Gullette, and the subgenre of the “female midlife 
progress novel” (77). Lipscomb argues that Vogel’s “handling of age and performance illustrates 
a different view of midlife progress: an age performative reflecting a more postmodern 
fragmentation of the self” (90). While Lipscomb looks to the age performances of both the Li’l Bit 
and the Greek Chorus, she begins her writings on the fragmentation of self by referring to the 
mind-body split in the penultimate scene of the play2 to argue that because “Li’l Bit’s no longer 
living in her body, the presentation of age…challenges the traditional memory-play concept of an 
essential, stable, ageless self, and complicates the issue of midlife progress” (92). While Joanna 
Mansbridge deliberately avoids pathologizing Lil Bit, she writes that Drive “employs a 
nonchronological structure, using detours and reverse movements to mimic the workings of 
memory, to reorient structures of empathy, and to map out a different temporal terrain of sexuality 
and subjectivity” (126). By “focusing on memory,” Drive, “mobilizes memories to pose questions 
about the present…mov[ing] us away from reading Li’l Bit’s story as the psychological journey 
of an individual protagonist and toward a broader understanding of the way memory renders 
conceptually and experientially porous the boundaries between individual and collective, the past 
and present” (125).  
 
2 In that scene—the First Driving Lesson—the Female Teenage Greek Chorus narrates eleven-year old Li’l Bit’s 
lines, while the actress playing Li’l Bit endures the physical memory of the assault  
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Mansbridge, of course, is not alone in her examination of the memory play genre, but critics 
disagree about Vogel’s use of the form. Several critics contextualize Vogel’s characterization of 
Li’l Bit in Tennessee Williams’ characterization of Tom Wingfield3, leading critics like Graley 
Herren to write that “this memory play traces its descent through The Glass Menagerie line, not  
the M.  Butterfly line” (107). For critics like Nouryeh, of course, this reading of memory is at odds 
with the diagnostic criteria for PTSD flashbacks. 
 Other critics distinguish among types of memory to make broader observations about how 
we recall narratives and how narrative memory can heal us. Alan Shepard and Mary Lamb, for 
example, argue that Vogel’s “formal experiments, together with her studies of transgressive 
subjects, create an atmosphere that opens spectators to the possibility of reimagining and 
sometimes re-scripting a number of America’s myths and historical truths” (199). Shepard and 
Lamb distinguish between memories of the mind and memories of the body, in their essay, to 
evaluate the ways that our understanding of space is shaped by sensory, rather than historical 
memory. Herren, too, distinguishes between forms of memory to demonstrate how healing in 
Drive is contingent upon “somehow converting…trauma from [an] ever-present performance to 
past narrative memory” (106). David Savran agrees with Herren’s assessment of performative 
healing, writing that Li’l Bit “imagines herself miraculously whole again through the power of 
memory” (196).  
Attilio Favorini is one of only a handful of critics to touch upon child and adolescent 
memory development in the play, writing that “conversational interactions that occur during events 
may facilitate children’s understanding of an experience and serve to organize the resulting 
representation…children learn from such interactions who I am in relation to who I was” (162). 
 
3 Vogel has, of course, spoken with David Savran about her affinity for Williams, saying, “I never ever fell out of 
love with Tennessee Williams” (116). 
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In chapter one, I ground my own writings on Li’l Bit’s developmental subjectivity in the power 
dynamics of these conversations, though I read memory through the philosophical language of 
complicity to argue that Li’l Bit’s memory-based construction of subjective agency is always-
already built upon her history of trauma.  
Several critics also speak to this notion of constructing a subjectivity in view of Li’l Bit’s 
creation of alternative forms of narration. In her essay, “Walls made out of paper,” Mary DeShazer 
offers a moving tribute to her friend and colleague, Lynda Hart, by reading Margaret Edson’s Wit 
and Vogel’s Drive, through Foucault’s discourse on madness and an alternate symbolic. She writes 
that the spacing of the alternate symbolic of theater allows Li’l Bit to be both herself and “her 
witness” just as the audience is called to witness and offer “multiple confirmations” of her 
performance (113). Sarah Lansdale Stevenson, too, writes of the split subjectivity of victims of 
sexual abuse, explaining how “a radical separation from the body is characteristic of the incest-
survivor’s relationship to her body” (232). Stevenson, however, concludes that, in the course of 
Peck’s abuse, Li’l Bit begins to see her breasts and other parts of her body as “no longer part of 
herself” (232). In a playful response to this essay, Susan Abbotson rightly argues that Vogel 
advocates for women to “take ownership of their own lives and bodies, thus wresting control from 
a manipulative and restrictive society” (2). It is this notion of “wresting control” that I address in 
chapter two as Li’l Bit manages to re-purpose Peck’s abuse as a survival strategy (2).  
Ann Pellegrini and Jennifer Griffiths both situate their readings of Drive in trauma writings 
of the early 1990’s as well as the political aims of second-wave feminists. Griffith’s argues that 
“Vogel’s play stages an intervention against the political-historical limitations of trauma treatment 
and a corrective measure against the erasure of the perpetrator in survivor discourse…the play 
serves as a warning that unless these painful ambiguities around the survivor-perpetrator dynamic 
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are addressed…survivor movements risk repeating the failure of earlier trauma paradigms” (93). 
Ann Pellegrini also writes of the limitations of survivor moments in medical discourse, arguing 
that “there is a complexity between victim/perpetrator relations that PTSD cannot lay hold of or 
recognize” (418). Pellegrini argues that “the secret” Li’l Bit speaks of at the play’s beginning is 
not the abuse, but Li’l Bit’s “ambivalent desire [for] and identification [with]” Peck (418).  
 Pellegrini is not the only critic to speak to Li’l Bit’s identification with Peck. In a New 
Historicist reading of Vogel’s text, Andrew Kimbrough reads Drive alongside James R. Kincaid’s 
Erotic Innocence assertion that “Yes, we all feel the attractiveness of children” (qtd in Kimbrough 
53). Kimbrough’s essay echoes Bigsby’s claim that the play is “about an America which struggles 
to sustain notions of innocence, spiritual concern, and family values while flooding its 
consciousness with sexual titillation” (Bigsby 320). Kimbrough ultimately argues that the play 
“testifies to the radical and self-implicating belief that community begins when we recognize that 
what we find most abhorrent and intolerable in others is really that which we find most fearful and 
shameful about ourselves” (49). Jennifer Griffiths has rightly observed that “the play’s depiction 
of its perpetrator…does not seem to reflect this kind of projection entirely, and the community’s 
faults do not seem to mirror the perpetrator,” and when I evaluate Vogel’s writing on community 
in chapter two, I look to the members of Li’l Bit’s community who do not, as Griffiths writes it, “ 
enable the abuse and its damage through gender stereotypes and an incomplete understanding of 
the survivor’s journey into resiliency” (107).  
In the way of mapping that journey into resiliency, I would like to conclude this essay by 
touching briefly on the gendered language that Andrew Kimbrough uses to contextualize his 
writings on child sexual abuse. Looking to Philip Jenkins’ Moral Panic, Kimbrough writes of 
“the concomitant fallacy that sex crimes against children are on the rise when evidence points to 
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the contrary, that adult sexual behavior with minors and children occurs less frequently now than it 
did in the past” (52). We “seem to be addicted,” he writes, “to our proclivity for creating hysteria” 
(49). As critics, we too could pathologize the present cultural moment. We, too, could speak in 
the medical language of addiction and Madwoman-in-the-Attic hysteria. We could treat truth-
telling like sickness and silence like good health. But we know better now. We know that one 
man’s comfortable silence is another woman’s lost scholarship. We know that we can no longer 
maintain simultaneous positions of acquiescence and intellectual integrity. We know that we can 
no longer maintain acquiescence and moral integrity. We are long overdue then for an analysis 
of blame in Drive that does not replicate the very cultural complicity that Vogel wrote about in 
1997. We owe it to our students.  
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2 THE FRAUGHT QUESTION OF COMPLICITY IN DRIVE: DEPENDENCY, 
MORALITY 
In an early 1998 interview, Paula Vogel sat in conversation with Arthur Holmberg to 
discuss Mark Brokaw’s spring 1997 off-Broadway production of Drive. Speaking on the 
ambivalent victim-perpetrator power dynamics in her work, Vogel framed Li’l Bit’s narration in 
notions of forgiveness and healing, telling Holmberg “There are two forgivenesses in the play. 
One forgiveness for Peck, but the most crucial forgiveness would be Li’l Bit’s forgiving Li’l Bit. 
Li’l Bit as an adult looking at and understanding her complicity” (qtd. In Holmberg 436). In play 
reviews, critics began to echo this language surrounding forgiveness and blame with one writer 
speaking to Vogel’s “fraught question of complicity” in the play (Smalec 589).  
In this first chapter, I revisit these early play review writings on complicity in Drive in 
the context of more recent public discussions of sexual violence to examine two questions: 
What do we mean, as critics, when we speak about Li’l Bit’s complicity, and how is that 
understanding of complicity related to blameworthiness? By reading Drive in conjunction with 
Christopher Kutz’s writings on joint-action complicity, I demonstrate how Li’l Bit’s 
blameworthiness is bound up in her dependency upon Peck. Ultimately, I argue that this 
dependency exempts her from moral scrutiny or full participation in what Kutz describes as the 
“the accountability system” (48). Drive, after all, is a play about systemic power and since “we 
are in . . . [a] cultural moment in the United States in which scandals about the abuse of power 
through sexual manipulation and assault proliferate in social media,” the critical language 
surrounding our own theatrical Lolitas and Humbert Humberts is in need of revision (Vogel 
“Preface”).  
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2.1 Drive, Complicity and the Critics 
Paula Vogel wrote and developed How I Learned to Drive during a 1996 residency at 
the Perseverance Theater in Juneau, Alaska (Drukman). When Mark Brokaw directed and 
premiered the play off-Broadway in March of 1997, Vogel’s work quickly and “quietly [began] 
tak[ing]the theater world by storm” (Morse and Vogel). Joe Adcock of the Seattle Post called 
the play a “spellbinding work of genius” (13). J. Wynn Rousuck wrote that “Vogel's writing 
[was] so strong that, in the end [the play’s] power [would] haunt [the audience], just as Li'l Bit's 
memories haunt[ed] her” (Rousuck). John L. Lehman wrote that Vogel “handle[d the] taboo 
[subject matter]” with “brilliance and humor” (35) and in the San Francisco Gate, Steven Winn 
spoke to these taboos by explaining that “Drive treats its stigmatized love affair with 
ambivalence and sympathy for both parties. Uncle Peck is not exactly a villain, nor is Li’l Bit 
entirely a victim. But then of course he is, and she is” (Winn). 
Writing on this ambivalence, early play reviewers generally spoke about the subject of 
complicity in less-than-specific terms. Stephanie Coen, for example, wrote that Peck was 
“disarmingly sympathetic [and] Li'l Bit unnervingly complicit” without specifying what she felt 
Li’l Bit was complicit in (30). David Benedict was similarly indirect, writing that “Vogel's non-
chronological cross-cutting” enabled the playwright “to examine not only the entire family's 
role in the act, but . . . Li’l Bit's own choices” (Benedict). Marilyn Stasio spoke more than 
directly Coen or Benedict, writing that Peck “understands [children] well enough to make them 
complicit in their own seduction” (21). Vogel was similarly forthcoming. One article read, 
“Ask Vogel if she feels her central character is in any way complicit in the abuse, and her 
answer is uncomfortable and complex. “I think she is. I think she is feeling complicit. I think 
she is taught to be complicit. I think we are all complicit” (J. Morgan 12). 
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In critical writings surrounding the play, scholars have been careful to distinguish 
between this notion of Li’l Bit as complicit in her Uncle’s abuse and Li’l Bit as a character 
“feeling complicit” in her Uncle’s abuse (J. Morgan 12). Jennifer Griffiths, for example, 
observes how Peck always “introduces the sense of choice” in his encounters with his niece 
“making her feel complicit if anything happens” (105). Griffiths leans on Li’l Bit’s own 
interpretation of the encounters, in other words, without assigning any value judgments of her 
own. Graley Herren argues that Li’l Bit’s forgiveness of her uncle is “tantamount to a 
concession that her relationship with [him], while undeniably involving moments of outright 
victimization, also contained a great deal more and that she was complicit in nurturing and 
actively participating in that arrangement” (110-111). V.B. Lipscomb distinguishes between 
Li’l Bit’s perspective and the perspective of the audience, in one section of her book chapter, 
writing that Peck’s encounter with Cousin Bobby “prevents the audience from framing excuses 
for Peck’s behavior,” even as it “mitigates Li’l Bit’s sense of complicity” as she is forced to 
come to terms with Peck’s pattern of perpetration (97). Andrew Kimbrough is careful to note 
that “Li’l Bit takes responsibility for a past for which she, as a child, could not have had 
responsibility,” while concluding that her “acceptance of culpability” is “part of the process of 
her growth and healing” (54). In general, then, critics tend to privilege Li’l Bit’s interpretation 
of her abuse over their own readings of Peck’s behavior.  
In writings on trauma, of course, theorists have long prioritized this kind of narrative 
agency from victims who look to testimony as a means of healing from trauma.4 In his 
Vicissitudes of Listening, for example, Dori Laub argues that “what is important,” in trauma 
 
4 In trauma theory, there is a lengthy history of psychoanalytic writings on this relationship between testimony and 
narrative agency. As defined in an example by Shoshana Felman, the testimony “is itself presented as an act of 
bearing witness to the trauma of survival [and] the event to which the testimony points and which it attempts to 
comprehend and grasp is enigmatically, at once historical and clinical” (20).  
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recovery, is not the “empirical historical facts” in a victim’s retelling of an event but the 
“discovery of knowledge . . .its evolution and its very happening” in the event of testimony 
(62). The process of narration, in other words may be more important to Li’l Bit’s healing than 
a precise, chronological retelling of a trauma narrative. It is for this reason that Ann Pellegrini 
privileges Li’l Bit’s interpretation and presentation of her relationship with her perpetrator over 
our own interpretations as critics, asking, “Must a rape narrative conform to naturalized scripts 
of injury and innocence in order to be legitimated as a real injury? What preexisting patterns of 
meaning-making and intelligibility shape what can be told, what can be heard” (421). 
Ultimately, Pellegrini concludes that, “The complexity of women’s responses to rape and other 
forms of violence cannot be comprehended by the demand to narrate violation and only 
violation” (420). Li’l Bit is under no obligation, in other words, to make her abuse “narrative 
conform to naturalized scripts of injury and innocence” (421).  
Insofar as “naturalized scripts of injury and innocence” shape our critical encounter with 
perpetrators like Peck, however, other cultural scripts of sexual promiscuity and female desire 
shape our interpretation of Li’l Bit’s victimization (421). Stefan Kanfer, for example, 
characterizes Li’l Bit as “not quite complicit in the affair but not entirely blameless either . . . a 
mixture of victim and unwitting temptress” (22). Susannah Clapp writes Li’l Bit as “if not 
manipulating at least complicit” (Clapp). Andrew Kimbrough writes that “Except for the early 
instance of molestation, L'il Bit and Uncle Peck mirror the real life example of Woody Allen and 
Soon Yi Previn, who are at this date married and raising a child together” (51)5. 
In recent criticism, of course, reviewers have moved away from these characterizations of 
Li’l Bit as a “manipulative” (Clapp) “temptress” (Kanfer), regularly speaking in the 
 
5 In the wake of Ronan Farrow’s work in the New York Times, the public has, of course, begun the process of 
reevaluating Allen’s legacy.  
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psychological language of “grooming” (Reid) and observing“the way the silky, seemingly 
gentle, troubled Uncle Peck has shepherded the illusion of consent” in his conversations with 
Li’l Bit. Daniel Meyer-Dinkgräf and Amanda M. Young-Houser are the first critics to give 
language to these changes in scholarship, writing in a recent book chapter, “Complicity implies 
that the person who is complicit is so knowingly and intentionally” (24). For Li’l Bit, they argue, 
this isn’t always so.  
While Meyer-Dinkgräf and Young-Houser mostly raise questions about the critical 
charges of complicity directed at Li’l Bit, Christopher Kutz’s writing on blame may provide 
answers and solutions for critics who continue to conflate Li’l Bit’s agency with Peck’s decision 
to abuse her. In the introduction, I outlined Saba Bazargan-Forward’s three methods of analyzing 
complicity and I ended that summary by providing an overview of Christopher Kutz’s writing on 
“participatory” relationships in analyses of joint-action complicity. In his analyses of 
blameworthiness, Kutz argues that children and adolescents “are treated as not responsible and 
hence not accountable for serious harms” because of their “cognitive and affective limitations” 
and because of the “objective rather than participatory” relationship they have with adults (50). 
In childhood and girlhood studies, critics speak to this relationship of dependency and the 
subject-object morality between adults and children in the language of “the adult-child polarity” 
(Kennedy 92). Because the child is “a transitional being” David Kennedy explains, childhood—
as a state—is “otherness, the excluded underside of adult subjectivity (92). Furthermore, because 
children in this transitional state are “only just acquiring the adult language games that interpret 
the limits of cause and effect . . . the boundaries between self and other, and the metaphysics of 
the self-body relation,” Kennedy suggests that childhood identity is intersubjective—not 
subjective—and “subdued and cultivated” by the adults to whom a child looks for survival (92). 
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To be certain, in speaking to intersubjectivity, Kennedy is primarily referring to younger 
children since there is a significant distinction between the “cognitive and affective” limitations 
of a toddler and those of an eleven-year old (50). Ann Pellegrini has spoken of these differences 
in Drive, noting how categorizing adult-child sexual contact” as “abuse squeezes out all moral 
ambiguity and also evacuates the category of childhood” (424). Older children, however must 
also encounter similar developmental gaps, especially when speaking to developmental concepts 
like “war, murder, criminality and the police” or to socially taboo sexual concepts, like rape or 
incest (Kennedy 15).  
In Rape and Resistance, for example, Linda Alcoff recalls the intersubjective experience 
of trying to talk about her rape, at age nine, without the discourse to make sense of it. She writes, 
“I didn’t have the language to name what happened. If I had been asked to tell, I would not have 
known what exactly to say. I was, as we used to say then, unaware of the facts of life. The word 
“rape” was not in my vocabulary, much less sexual abuse, sexual violence or pedophilia” (25). 
L’il Bit is not, of course, nine years old, but she faces the same developmental gap that Alcoff 
does as she attempts to find language for Peck’s abuse.  
Vogel most directly draws attention to Lil’s Bit’s naiveté toward the developmental gap 
in a conversation Li’l Bit has with her mother, Lucy, during the play’s final moments. 
Forbidding Li’l Bit from joining Uncle Peck on a car ride to the beach, Lucy tells Li’l Bit that 
Peck is “a small town hick who learned to mix drinks from Hugh Hefner” (87). Li’l Bit asks, 
“Who’s Hugh Hefner?” in a moment that might have been funny had the audience not just 
witnessed Uncle Peck’s Playboy photo shoot (87). When Li’l Bit argues back with her mother 
that she needs a “father figure” and “someone to look out for [her],” Vogel makes it clear that Lil 
Bit hasn’t any idea what it is that she needs protection from (87). Writing on that missing 
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information, Mary DeShazer has spoken of the “belated historicity” (111) in Li'l Bit's 
observation that, even the way her family was, she was nearly sixteen before she learned that 
“pedophilia did not mean someone who loved to bicycle” (Vogel 14). That latency in experience 
is not by any means a psychic amnesia or a crisis of language, but rather a difference in language 
as formulated by a non or partial-participant in the moral system still learning “the language 
games” of grown-up sex rituals (Kennedy 16). Unfortunately, in that moment Lucy does nothing 
to educate Li’l Bit as she adapts to Kutz’s “accountability system” (48), telling her with some 
resignation, “If anything happens I’ll hold you responsible” (88). 
Again, the audience might have had a different reaction here had Vogel not already 
written this language into an earlier scene in the play. At fifteen, Li’l Bit asks her mother and 
grandmother if sex is painful. Her mother responds truthfully, explaining that sex hurts, “Just a 
little bit. Like a pinch” (42). Her grandmother, on the other hand, disagrees vehemently. “Tell 
her it hurts!” she says. “It’s agony! You think you’re going to die! Especially if you do it before 
marriage!” (42). Lucy turns from her daughter to her mother saying, “I’m going to tell her the 
truth . . .you left me and Mary completely in the dark with fairy tales and told us to go to the 
priest” (42). If someone had taught “me something about the facts of life, I wouldn’t have had to 
marry . . . that no-good-son-of-a [bitch]” (44). Grandmother says back, “I hold you responsible!” 
When Lucy parrots that phrase in the last scene, Vogel demonstrates how trauma is as cyclical as 
bad sexual education (44). Because Grandmother refuses to sexually educate her daughters, Lucy 
eventually finds herself penniless and pregnant. When Li’l Bit’s father abandons his daughter 
and his wife, Li’l Bit finds herself in need of both paternal support and the kind of sexual 
education her mother probably could have used in adolescence. There is a certain sense of 
dramatic irony, then, when Mother ends the conversation with Grandmother by naming the threat 
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Li’l Bit already knows too well, saying, “If she doesn’t find out from me, where is she going to 
find out? In the streets?” (42). For Li’l Bit, sexual education began in “the streets,” years before 
this conversation (42). 
In early writings on the play, critics tended to lose sight of these gaps in Li’l Bit’s sexual 
development because of the shifts in chronology. Herren has observed, for example, how Li’l 
Bit’s selection of a “chronologically late and relatively benign scene” at the start of the play 
“effectively paints Peck in a far kinder light” (109). That generosity towards her uncle, however, 
also leaves her more vulnerable to charges of complicity as critics fail to reconcile Peck’s 
empathy with his ongoing abuse (109)Andrew Kimbrough, for example, frames Li’l Bit’s 
development in a kind of innate sexual precociousness, writing her as a “prescient teenager 
aware of her budding sexual allure” (51). That language of “prescience,” however, does not align 
with this first moment of early adolescent sexual naiveté, leading critics like Bigsby to write that 
Vogel’s chronology forces the audience to “revise its reaction to the early scene . . . as Li’l Bit 
becomes first seventeen, then sixteen, then fifteen, and, finally, eleven” (1609). In evaluating the 
play in line with this development, Vogel makes it clear that Li’l Bit’s seeming prescience 
emerges from her trauma history. She is prescient because “she has been taught,” about her 
sexuality prematurely (J. Morgan 12). While many critics, Kimbrough and others, have shown 
great determination in characterizing Li’l Bit as nearly-an-adult in Drive, those same critics fail 
to acknowledge that she is, by the same token, nearly-a-child, too.  
In Li’l Bit’s relationship with Peck, Vogel initially frames Peck’s manipulation in Li’l 
Bit’s childhood naiveté towards, not just sex and Playboy, but the law. To this end, Peck often 
coerces Li’l Bit into minor legal transgressions before coercing or forcing her into more 
traumatizing sexual transgressions. During their first car ride together, for example, Peck 
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preemptively buys Li’l Bit’s silence before he ever begins abusing her by offering to let her 
drive. Li’l Bit voices her concern, saying, “It’s against the law at my age!” but Peck insists, that 
he “started driving” at her age before adding in a conspiratorial tone, “you can’t tell anyone I’m 
letting you do this” (89). While Li’l Bit’s legal violation may only appear incidental given Peck’s 
sexual violation, clinicians and law enforcement officials who work with victims of sexual abuse 
would likely disagree. 
In studies of disclosure rates—that is, in studies of children who come forward to 
authorities with allegations of sexual abuse in childhood—the fear of “getting into trouble” is a 
considerable barrier in police interviews (M. Morgan and Edwards 110). For adolescents like 
Li’l Bit, this vague fear often emerges from confusion and self-blame. The American Prosecutors 
Research Institute, for example, observes that an offender like Peck “may enhance the 
attractiveness of his company with alcohol or drugs, prohibited video games, and sexually 
explicit materials” (3). Such moral equivocations—a young girl’s belief that she will get into just 
as much trouble for playing a video game or driving a car as her uncle will for abusing her—are 
not always easy for adults to understand, but they are real fears for children and adolescents 
conditioned to trust the authority figures who “teach [them] things” (Vogel 87)..  
In a recent book chapter on Drive, Daniel Meyer-Dinkgräfe and Amanda M. Young-
Hauser argue that “Li’l Bit is not at all complicit,” in this scene, because “complicity . . . implies 
that the person who is complicit is so knowingly and intentionally” (24). This view of complicity 
as a moral outcome of knowledge and knowing has emerged explicitly in the discourse of the 
#metoomovement and implicitly in the work of theorists like Kutz who write of child-adult 
relationships in the language of moral “dependency” (50). When Li’l Bit steps into Peck’s car, 
neither her mother nor her uncle has given her the sexual or legal information she needs to 
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contextualize Peck’s betrayal, therefore any criticism of Li’l Bit’s complicity at age eleven must 
be foregrounded in the developmental knowledge that she lacks. This sexual violation is simply 
an example of Kutz’s non-“partcipat[ory]” “objective” relationships (50).  
Critics rarely disagree about the power dynamics surrounding the abuse in this scene, 
especially since Li’l Bit cannot “reach the pedals” and is not so much driving Peck’s car as she is 
navigating at the mercy of someone controlling the gas and brake (87). Yet even as an older 
adolescent, after Li’l Bit has begun to understand the sexual power dynamics between her Uncle 
and herself, she continues to find herself vulnerable to Peck’s sexual advances because of her 
dependence upon him for sexual and legal information. As she enters Peck’s basement for a 
photo shoot, he reminds her that she has “drawn the line” in terms of sexual boundaries in the 
photo shoot and she tells him, with some apparent understanding of nudity clauses in business 
law, “That’s right. No full-frontal nudity” (60). Peck “tries not to laugh,” as she tells him that she 
has been “reading” (60). Evidently, Li’l Bit has been studying to give herself the sexual 
education she lacked at age eleven.   
But then the legal parameters change again. Peck tells her, “You’re doing great work. If 
we keep this up, in five years we’ll have a really professional portfolio. (64). Once again, Li’l Bit 
consents to one contract—photographs with no full-frontal nudity—only to discover that she has 
already been participating in a different contract. While Vogel’s play predates legislation 
surrounding revenge pornography, “forty-six states” have recently criminalized the very abuse of 
power Vogel addresses in this scene (Mark et al). While someone in Li’l Bit’s position might 
consent to being photographed then lawmakers have recently reckoned with the ethics of ex-
partners sharing photos without the consent of the women in them. In 1969, Li’l Bit has no such 
legal recourse but this more recent legislation is indicative of the uneven power dynamics in the 
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scene. While many critics frame Li’l Bit’s next choice to unbutton her shirt as an act of 
complicity, it is still a decision bound up in Li’l Bit’s dependence upon Peck for emotional and 
sexual information. The decision is, in the first place, an act of emotional dependence; Peck is 
the only figure in her life consistently admiring and expressing his love for her, even as he 
justifies abusing her with his emotional support.6  
But Li’l Bit has more pragmatic motivations, too. At the beginning of scene, she tells the 
audience of the “small room” or “zone” set aside “in every man’s home” where “he keeps his 
manly toys: the Vargas pinups, the tackle,” the explicit photos of his underage relative, and these 
objects are guarded by an “invisible sign . . . reading Girls Keep Out” (59). Li’l Bit has entered a 
man’s domain of rules and secrecy in other words, and while we can label her as complicit for 
playing by the rules Peck sets in that zone, we must also acknowledge that the very notion of 
playing by anyone’s rules is, by its definition, an act of submission. Peck has already 
demonstrated his insincerity to Li’l Bit by telling her that the photos that were meant to be “just 
between [her and him]” (65) might also be suitable for Playboy and he has demonstrated his 
narcissism by questioning the legitimacy of Li’l Bit’s self-protective (“I don’t want anybody 
seeing this”) concern, saying, “If that’s the way you feel five years from now, it will remain that 
way” (65). Just as Peck swore her to secrecy at age eleven by framing his sexual violation in her 
violation of the law, Peck frames this new violation in a different adolescent fear—the fear of 
 
6 Psychologist, Adrian Powell, has written that, “the paedophile will identify and take advantage of the 
child’s needs,” (22) and it is the job of those adults working with the child in recovery to “reinforce . . . that the error 
was not in the child’s wanting attention or pleasure but in the teaching given by the perpetrator” (Wieland 37). Some 
critics have, of course, become distracted by Li’l Bit’s dual motivations in this scene, since she wants and needs 
attention as an adolescent, but does not necessarily want to be photographed for a public forum in order to secure 
that attention. 
 
24 
exposure and peer ridicule. Having already mentioned her frustration with “the boys at school” 
(62), she now expresses a fear of exposure by mentioning them again, telling Peck, “Any boy 
around here could just pick up, just go into the Stop & Go and buy” (65). By momentarily 
aligning herself with Peck’s interests, she protects herself from the possibility of future social 
estrangement among her classmates. This calculated attempt to cooperate with the man 
threatening her with blackmail, however, also means that her complicity is bound up in her 
dependency upon Peck to keep the original pictures to himself, out of sight of the “Neanderthals 
in short pants” (62). 7  
In her writings on child sexual abuse, Sharon Lamb has spoken of these acts of 
complicity as “choiceless choices” (38). She writes that when victims of abuse “have the courage 
to tell someone,” of ongoing abuse, for example, the “result of their disclosure is their removal 
from the household . . . or the loss of many other aspects of their lives that they treasure” (38). 
Although they “may see themselves as making a choice to keep the family together, or taking 
care of a ‘sick’ daddy, these are choiceless choices since either way these victims lose” (38). Li’l 
Bit, in other words, might choose to have her picture taken in order to maintain some semblance 
of control over the photoshoot, but she must also surrender her own privacy and safety in that 
exchange. That relationship between survival and dependency, of course, serves as the basis for 
Peck’s and Li’l Bit’s entire relationship. As Jennifer Griffiths has explained, “Li’l Bit’s 
body/sexuality keeps him stable. He has convinced her that she is capable of and responsible for 
rescuing him from himself. As her only source of support, she must comply with this 
 
7 Posing for more explicit pictures may, of course, seem like a counterintuitive survival strategy, but it is a strategy 
based in Li’l Bit’s anxiety and the psychological reality that sex offenders “blackmail. . . children to provide further 
images [of child sexual abuse] or sexual favors based on [prior] footage or images of the child obtained illegally” 
(Sanderson 66). 
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arrangement to continue to receive this support” (105). Such “negotiations always introduce the 
sense of choice, making her feel complicit if anything happens” (105).  
The choiceless choices Li’l Bit makes, however, do not always have the life-or-death 
implications of her early choices. It is one thing to get a sixteen-year old drunk but quite another 
to put an eleven-year old at the wheel of a moving vehicle. Li’l Bit does, after all, eventually 
develop the language and sexual education to determine that “pedophilia does not mean someone 
who love[s to] bicycle” (14) and—in this sense—she seems to surpass Kutz’s notion of the 
“cognitive limitations” of younger adolescents (50). She has not, however, managed to fully 
overcome the adult-child, subject-object polarity in her relationship with her uncle, since Peck 
also maintains his authority over her in power dynamics outside of the language of sexual or 
legal education. It is for this reason that Kutz does not write of the relationship between age and 
emotional maturity as “scalar,” but rather views age as one factor among a “multiplicity of 
relations” between agents in a moral system (26). This is to say that, regardless of how quickly 
Li’l Bit adapts to Peck’s teaching style, her relationship with him is still rooted in the “affective 
limitations” of her trauma history (Kutz 50). 8 
In addressing this continual interplay between Li’l Bit’s early reactions to Peck’s abuse 
and her later adolescent reactions, Vogel initially presents Li’l Bit as a figure caught between 
terror and immobility. During her second driving lesson at age fifteen, for example, Peck asks 
her to do a safety check during which she checks the side and rearview mirrors of the car. In her 
final monologue, Li’l Bit performs the same safety check again, but when she “adjusts the 
rearview mirror” for the second time, she catches “the spirit of Uncle Peck” in the light “sitting 
in the back seat of the car” (92). Because Vogel uses this stage business to convey Li’l Bit’s 
 
8 Kutz uses the word “limitations,” but we could also call this an affective difference. (50).  
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reflections on her past memories of trauma, it is in this moment that she begins to voice concern 
for her safety based on her first driving lesson with Uncle Peck. When he asks her to lock the 
doors, she jokes, “But then I’m locked in with you” before asking more seriously, “If I put my 
hands on the wheel—how do I defend myself?” (49). Peck, then, tells her that he “will never 
touch [her]” while she’s driving, though he of course might have more accurately said, I will 
never touch you again (49).  
When Mansbridge writes that Drive “mobilizes memories to raise questions about the 
present” (125), she is primarily referring to the memories that the present-day Li’l Bit mobilizes 
as a narrator in order to “floor it” in the direction of healing at the end of the play (92). In 
looking to Atillo Favorini’s notion of “facilitated representations” of trauma (162), however, 
Vogel makes it clear that, in this moment, as much as Li’l Bit would like to believe Uncle Peck 
when he tells her that her life is “in her own two hands,” her experience with Peck, at age eleven, 
stands in direct contradiction to the present driving lesson (49). Li’l Bit is always looking 
backward then, even as Peck insists that she keep her eyes on the road. History after all is the 
only way that she will ever learn how to remain ten steps ahead of her uncle. In this sense, her 
very survival is dependent upon the information and education Peck is willing to impart to her in 
a relationship of limited “participat[ion]” (Kutz 26). 
This is not, of course, to say that Li’l Bit has managed to consistently outthink Peck by 
the second driving lesson since she still has much to learn in the way of Peck’s education. A 
month after that conversation, Peck invites Li’l Bit to celebrate her first long-distance drive by 
riding with her to an inn an hour away on the Eastern Shore. There, he talks her into ordering a 
cocktail. In this scene, he recycles an older method of manipulation—the same one he used when 
he first let her drive—by assuring her that she can drink underage as long as she remains under 
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his adult supervision. He explains to her that restaurants “on the Eastern Shore [are] European . . 
. and very understanding if gentlemen wish to escort attractive young ladies who might want a 
before-dinner cocktail” (23). Notably, he himself remains sober. Once Peck has gotten Li’l Bit 
sufficiently drunk, Vogel revisits this notion of student-teacher and adolescent-adult dependency 
by objectifying Li’l Bit in the language of a disabled car. The Voice tells the audience, “Even 
with careful maintenance and preventative operation of your automobile, it is all too common for 
us to experience an unexpected breakdown” (30). As Li’l Bit stumbles on her way to the car, 
Peck “swoops her up his arms,” before “gently deposit[ing] her on the front seat” (30).  
In the next moment, Peck challenges not only the boundaries of Li’l Bit’s understanding 
of the laws surrounding underage drinking, but her moral framework for their entire relationship. 
Though Li’l Bit is well aware of her uncle’s interest in young girls and boys, she does not yet use 
the language of sexual abuse to describe it. In this scene, she writes their interactions as a kind of 
sexual affair, saying that what they’re doing “isn’t right . . . it isn’t nice to Aunt Mary” (31). 
Peck, of course, pushes back against her interpretation asking, “Have I forced you to do 
anything?” (32). In this moment, though, the alcohol has compromised Li’l Bit’s judgment. 
Vogel writes that “there is a long pause as [she] tries to get sober enough to think this through” 
before saying, “I guess not” (32). Had Li’l Bit entered the car sober, she might have responded to 
Peck’s question differently. Instead, she ends the moment by kissing Peck and then moving away 
from him “dizzy again” (32). 
As Peck makes his way downstage, in the next moment, Vogel replicates this back-and-
forth motion during Peck’s fishing trip with Cousin Bobby. Peck and Bobby have taken to the 
river to spend the day looking for pompano which Peck tells Bobby are “shy, mercurial fish” 
(34). As Bobby hooks a pompano, Peck coaches him saying “Tip the rod up—not too sharp—
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hook it—all right, now easy, reel and then rest—let it play. And reel—play it out, that’s right” 
(35). Christopher Bigsby has noted that Peck’s “strategy with fish mirrors that which he adopts 
with the young woman [and young man] he desires” (1609). If Peck only ever pulls on his line—
if he strictly depends upon force, in other words—the line between the fish and himself will snap 
or the fish will swim away. At the restaurant, Peck is content to expedite the process of tiring Li’l 
Bit out—of letting her play—by weakening her sense of judgment with cocktails. In order to 
maintain the tension in the line between them, though, he returns to his reel-then- rest approach 
by also reminding her that he hasn’t “forced [her] to do anything” (32). In this way, he sets the 
parameters for her interpretations of their encounters. 
That definition of trauma has, of course, surfaced and resurfaced in criticism surrounding 
the play in view of Vogel’s complex writings on victimization. Ann Pellegrini, for example, has 
written of rape as the “paradigm of [sexual] injury” since it implies a strict separation between 
innocent victims and villainous perpetrators in comparison to other kinds of sexual violence 
(420). Jennifer Griffiths, too, “differentiate[s] the levels of damage [after trauma]” by situating 
her argument about victim agency in the Rind Study9 (96). While Griffiths immediately 
acknowledges that the study is “deeply flawed,” she views the cultural response to the 
implications in the study as a signifier of our reluctance “to consider variations to the cultural 
narrative of childhood sexual abuse” (96). The authors of the study concluded, she goes on to 
explain, that “if a child was coerced particularly by violence or the threat of violence, the 
emotional consequences were much more severe . . . [and if] a child . . . had some agency within 
the situation . . . the presence of that agency [could] account for a child’s resiliency in later 
 
9 The Rind Study was a controversial study led by Bruce Rind in 1997. Rind concluded that the psychological long-
term harm associated with sexual abuse was dependent upon the degree of coercion and force used by the 
perpetrator. 
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years” (Griffiths 96). Though Griffiths is careful to note that this view of trauma is “hardly a 
nuanced one,” she concludes that “Li’l Bit’s resilience [in overcoming Peck’s abuse] comes from 
her ability to remain aware of the shifts in power and to see herself as having some control 
within the situation” (99). 
Though I do not disagree with this aspect of Griffiths’ analysis, that notion of “the 
presence of agency” may have different emotional implications of harm for children and 
adolescents not coerced or threatened with violence during abuse (96). Some psychologists who 
work with victims of child sexual abuse, for example, have written that an “overt use of physical 
force makes it easier for a child to recognize that the CSA was unwanted and forced upon him,” 
and, therefore, “makes it easier for the child to blame the abuser rather than himself because the 
subtle mixture of love, affection, and sexual activity are not present” (Sanderson 49). When force 
is used in sexual abuse, in other words, victims almost always respond “to the experiences “very 
negatively” (105). If, however, a child has agency, “damage is caused primarily by guilt. The 
more a child imagines that he or she had complicity in the affair, the more guilty he or she will 
feel, and the harder it will be to get over the experience” (106). 10 In her analysis of this kind of 
complicity, Sharon Lamb writes that “Any self-blame [at all is] associated with poorer [long-
term] adjustments” (32). While Li’l Bit’s terror during the first driving lesson, might mean that 
she is more traumatized in that moment, the guilt and self-blame she experiences in the absence 
of terror may have other implications for more “long-term harm” (106). In Li’l Bit’s case, the 
absence of force “makes it easier” for her to take responsibility for some of Peck’s behavior even 
as Peck continues to set the rules for their encounters in the same way that he set the rules for the 
photo shoot when Li’l Bit was thirteen (Sanderson 49). In this sense, it is not surprising that Li’l 
 
10 “Damage” is Griffiths’ word and, to be clear, it refers to psychological harm (106). 
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Bit initially tries to frame the power dynamics of her sexual encounters in the context of 
infidelity rather than abuse, nor is it surprising that Peck reels a drunk, played-out Li’l Bit 
towards an alternate definition of the experience. In doing so, he preemptively denies her right to 
feel violated. Once again her interpretation and judgment is dependent upon Peck’s interpretation 
and judgment. 
While this absence of force or violence confuses Li’l Bit, critics too, are not immune to 
Vogel’s charm and seduction.11 Ideal victims, after all, are defined by their weakness12 while 
victims with power are harder to read. In scene one of the play, for example, critics read Li’l 
Bit’s reaction to Peck’s touch with ambivalence. Susan Abbotson writes that Li’l Bit is “capable 
of enjoying her breasts on her own terms” (6). As Peck kisses them, Li’l Bit “rears back her 
head” (Vogel 12) in what Abbotson concludes is “ecstasy” (6). Pellegrini argues that Li’l Bit’s 
“measured response [toward Peck’s physical touch in that moment] . . . walks the line between 
desire and resignation” (422). Depending upon the choices of the actress and the interpretation of 
those choices by the audience then, Li’l Bit may appear to be rearing her head back in ecstasy, as 
Abbotson concludes, or leaning her head back in emotionally-detached resignation. 
Unsurprisingly, it is the first scene that Bigsby calls a “parodic teenage tryst” (1608). 
That ambivalence, of course, is partly dependent upon Li’l Bit’s presentation of the 
memory which Bigsby has called “relaxed and not overtly exploitative” (1608). The stage 
directions read that “The two sit facing directly front. They do not move. Their bodies remain 
passive. Only their facial expressions emote” (8). Graley Herren has written that this limited 
 
11 Critics have written of the power of seduction in Drive since the play opened. Ben Brantley, for example writes 
that between Vogel and Peck “it is hard to say who is the more accomplished seducer” (Brantley). 
12 In his writings on ideal victims, criminologist Nils Christie examines five characteristics that influence our 
sympathy towards victims of crimes. He argues that “the [ideal] victim is weak . . . the victim was carrying out a 
respectable project . . . she could not be blamed for where she was . . . the offender was big and bad . . . the offender 
was in no personal relationship to her” (1). 
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representation of physical engagement is “not nearly so disturbing” (108) and Bigsby concludes 
that “power seems to reside with the young woman rather and not the man whose behavior 
makes him seem younger than he is, and more dependent” (1608). The limited physical 
engagement, however, both empowers Li’l Bit as narrator of her own story and requires the 
audience to listen more carefully to the verbal exchanges on stage since—regardless of Li’l Bit’s 
appearance of agency—that agency cannot simply be separated from her history of sexual abuse. 
When we listen to Li’l Bit alongside a chronology that accounts for her early adolescent 
development, then, we get the sense of a young girl who is constantly listening for changes in 
conversational tone, for a driving lesson that is about to become violent. Though the 
conversation may be read as mutually flirtatious, it is also steeped in Li’l Bit’s abusive 
interpersonal history with her Uncle and the “affective limitations” of an adolescent trauma 
victim (Kutz 50). Peck, for example, tells her that he loves the smell of her hair and she responds 
to this line by alternating between the passivity and self-protection she learned in early 
adolescence. She initially only says, “Uh-huh,” before quickly moving to establish firmer 
boundaries in the conversation when she anticipates that Peck is preparing to change the tone of 
it (8). After Li’l Bit tells him that she uses Herbal Essence shampoo, he begins what is probably 
a typical projection of sexual fantasy by saying, “I’m gonna buy me some . . . and when I’m all 
alone in the house, I’m going to get into the bathtub and uncap the bottle and—” Li’l Bit stops 
him, saying, “Be good,” intuiting how the sentence is likely going to end (8). But Peck says, 
“What did you think I was going to say? . . . I’m going to wash my hair. That’s all” (8). When 
Li’l Bit tells Peck that she thought he was planning to do “something nasty” with the shampoo, 
Peck says with surprise, “With shampoo? Lord, gal—your mind!” (8). Li’l Bit asks, “And whose 
fault is it?” (8). This last line speaks back to the ways in which Peck’s sexual imagination has 
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influenced Li’l Bit’s own sexual imagination in the course of her adolescent development. Had 
Peck responded to this assessment with self-defense or denial, the scene might have turned out 
very differently, but Peck is careful to keep his tone playful, lest Li’l Bit spend too much time 
thinking about the uneven power dynamics that have led her to self-protection. 
Though Vogel only touches on the possibility of Li’l Bit’s dependency upon Peck in this 
exchange, she is more explicit at another point in the scene. As Peck removes Li’l Bit’s bra, she 
tells him, shivering, “It’s a little cold,” and he quickly interprets her physical reaction for her, 
telling her, “That isn’t why you’re shaking” (12). Peck is not, of course, the first sex offender to 
lay claim to authority over the physical sensations and experiences of someone else’s body but—
given the lengths to which Li’l Bit goes to maintain this bodily alienation via alcoholism—this is 
one of the most subtle and traumatically violent moments in the play. In this scene, of course, the 
adult Li’l Bit also reclaims some sense of bodily authority by situating herself as a “post-victim” 
who now has the power to reimagine her trauma (Herren 106). As I close this essay, I want to 
draw attention to the power of that imaginative revision.  
My purpose in writing this essay has never been as hopeful as the criticism that has come 
before it in view of writings on the adult survivor of trauma and her capacity for healing. I 
examine, instead, the vulnerable child victim in the present-tense process of traumatization. If 
theater can help us “find . . . a way to reinvest our energies in a different future . . . full of hope 
and reanimated by a new, more radical humanism,” as Jill Dolan has written, I’d like to believe 
that this essay promotes hope in other ways (3). I hope that our readings of complicity in Drive 
will eventually include the language of grooming, dependency, and childhood intersubjectivity. I 
hope that, in sorting through these power dynamics, we move one step closer to dismantling the 
systemic powers that perpetuate the violence of perpetrators like Peck. I hope that the work of 
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#metoo activists has not been done in vain in that process of dismantling systemic power. And I 
hope more than anything else that those voices like Li’l Bit’s and Linda Alcoff’s are no longer 
misrepresented in the teaching and criticism of this play. We have a critical responsibility to 
make space for our theatrical Lolitas for the sake of both our students and the audiences that 
continue to see themselves in Vogel’s work.  
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3 CHANGING GEARS: LI’L BIT’S TRAJECTORY FROM VICTIM TO SURVIVOR 
In 2018, Playbill released an Equity Principal Audition call for the David Morse-Mary 
Louise Parker 2020 revival of Drive in which Li’l Bit was described as “smart, tough, funny, 
sensual, and sensitive. A survivor” (“Casting Call”). That last alliterative descriptor—Li’l Bit as 
a survivor—emerged in the early criticism and interviews surrounding Drive and has re-emerged 
in public discourse in the wake of the MeToo Movement. In 1997, for example, Vogel spoke to 
Arthur Holmberg of a “culture of victimization,” that encouraged “people to dwell in their 
identity as victims” (436). In contrast to that culture, she wrote Li’l Bit as someone who learns, 
through abuse, “how to survive” (436). In a recent and real-life example of Vogel’s reflections 
on resilience and survival, 140 of Larry Nassar’s victims were honored with the Arthur Ashe 
Medal of Courage for testifying to his abuse in court and, in an ESPN article, they were 
identified as “sister survivors” (Maine). This distinction between survivor and victim was, of 
course, a major theoretical concern for second wave feminist activists. In 1979, for example, 
Kathleen Barry argued that being “defined as a victim,” means to “deny that identity is ongoing 
and changing” (47). Vogel puts it another way, telling Charlie Rose of victims of crimes who get 
“into a rut and spin . . . [their] wheels over and over and over again” (Morse and Vogel). In 
contrast, Barry continues, survivors depend upon “will, action, [and] initiative” (47) to get out of 
the rut and, “floor it” as Li’l Bit does at the end of Drive (Vogel 91).  
In this chapter, I study Li’l Bit’s trajectory from victim of trauma to survivor of trauma 
alongside Robin James’ writings on feminism and resilience discourse. Though James is a 
musicologist and philosopher, her analyses of the performances of women pop stars intersect 
with trauma theory and feminist writings on post-traumatic growth. In Resilience and 
Melancholy, James argues that feminist resilience narratives replicate and reinforce misogyny by 
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framing the objectification of women’s bodies as a means of subjectification. In Vogel’s play, 
Li’l Bit recycles Peck’s objectification into a survival strategy  of bodily alienation in order to 
end her relationship with him and, by reading that process in the context of James’ writings, I 
argue that Vogel writes this survival as a matter of Li’l Bit’s flexibility and creativity towards 
Peck’s “gifts…inside that box of abuse” rather than her endurance of them (Holmberg 436). In 
doing so, I especially attend to Li’l Bit’s mixed metaphors of flight, in the play, as double-
signifiers of both escapism and physical escape itself to examine the ways in which Li’l Bit 
subverts Peck’s escapism into an escape route. 
In her writings on feminist narratives of overcoming, Robin James looks to Mark 
Neocleous’ assertion that the rhetoric of military resilience has replaced the rhetoric of military 
security. Resilience, as Neocleous explains it, “connotes the capacity of a system to return to a 
previous state, to recover from a shock, or to bounce back after a crisis or trauma” (3). While the 
military security of past decades entailed prevention and protection from crises, in other words, 
the military resilience of more recent years anticipates and prepares for crises in order to recover 
from them more quickly. For this reason, Neocleous concludes, the military now speaks “of 
resilience and its (positive) connotations” instead of speaking “of fragility and its (negative) 
associations” (3).  
 Robin James begins her theory of feminine resilience with this premise of fragility-as-
security by turning Neocleous’ military writings onto the traditional understanding of ideal 
feminine embodiment as vulnerability (80). In traditions of ideal femininity, women are taught, 
as Iris Marion Young writes it, “to approach a physical engagement with things with timidity, 
uncertainty, and hesitancy” (34). Moreover, women “often experience [their] bodies as . . . 
fragile encumbrance[s], rather than the medium for the enactment of [their] aims” (Young 34). 
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Because of this cultural shift from security-thinking to resilience-thinking, however, James 
proposes that, while resilience-femininity “assumes that women are always already damaged by 
[a] patriarchy” that renders them fragile, ‘good’ women visibly overcome the negative effects of” 
that damage (82). Femininity, then, “is performed first as damage, second as resilience” (82). In 
the fitness industry, writers have represented this shift from “good” frailty to “good” resilience 
by reconceptualizing their marketing strategies from the visible fragility of traditionally 
underweight bodies to the muscular strength of athletic bodies. In the online magazine Women’s 
Fitness, for example, one article title reads, “Strong is the new skinny” (“Why Strong”); 
security-bodies, then, are disciplined into weightlessness, resilience-bodies are disciplined into 
muscle.  
That strategy shift does not, of course, disrupt the objectification of women’s bodies, but 
rather the standards by which women are objectified. In turn, James explains, objectification is 
made more economical. Resilience, then, not only requires women to “bounc[e] back from injury 
and crisis,” but to “capitalize on deficits so that [they] end up ahead of where [they] initially 
started (one step back, two steps forward)” (4). In the case of the Women’s Fitness article, this 
resilience in the face of objectification “reinforces and strengthens patriarchy,” because it’s no 
longer “the sexism that needs collective overcoming, but individual women that need to be 
“resilient” in the face of unavoidable, persistent sexism” (85). Because resilience discourse is not 
about overcoming patriarchy, but upgrading it, then, the notion of “objectification (being looked 
at)” is repurposed as a resource for “subjectification (overcoming)” (106).  
In Drive, Li’l Bit manages to escape her relationship with her Uncle by capitalizing on 
the “deficit” of his objectification even as she learns to replicate the very misogyny that 
undermines her subjectification (4). Jill Dolan, for example, has written of the complexity of this 
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objectification-as-subjectification narrative in her reading of Peck’s photo shoot. Dolan writes 
that, while “Peck’s motives are not pure . . . the experience instills in Li'l Bit a sense of her own 
allure, a glimpse of a budding sexuality that's powerful to her in a family life in which she is 
otherwise naive and powerless” (127). As Li’l Bit grows up, she then uses this power as a means 
of subjectification. In the next section of this chapter, I evaluate the limitations of objectification 
as one of the “gifts inside [Vogel’s] box of abuse” to argue that Li’l Bit survives not because of 
Peck’s “gifts,” but because of her own creativity in using Peck’s resources against him 
(Holmberg 437). In this section, I evaluate Bigsby’s speculation that “Peck has summoned Li’l 
Bit into being, or at least forged him into a weapon against himself,” in view of the questions that 
Deborah Hull raises in her dissertation on Drive. Hull writes, “Yes, Uncle Peck empowers Li’l 
Bit with the knowledge she eventually uses to “think what the other guy is going to do before he 
does it,” but why? Vogel states that she “think[s] he taught his niece how to reject him,” but she 
does not say that he intentionally taught her how to reject him (Morse and Vogel). In revisiting 
Hull’s and Bigsby’s questions, I hope to return agency to Li’l Bit who survives, not because of 
the gift of Peck’s abuse, but because of her subversion of it (324). 
3.1 Subjectification and Objectification 
In readings of Vogel’s text, much of Peck’s abuse falls along a continuum between 
objectification and subjectification. David Savran, for example, has written that the photo shoot 
is “the center of the play, for it is in this scene that Li’l Bit most graphically becomes an object 
for Uncle Peck, and more ominously, for herself as well” (264). Vogel, in fact, frames Li’l Bit’s 
objectification in a lengthier cultural history of men objectifying women. The stage directions 
read, “Throughout the shoot, there can be a slide montage of actual shots of the actor playing Li’l 
Bit—interspersed with other models à la Playboy, Calvin Klein and Victoriana/Lewis Carroll’s 
38 
Alice Liddell” (62). The photographs of Li’l Bit herself, however, represent a simultaneous 
process of subjectification and objectification. Peck, for example, tells Li’l Bit that she is a “very 
beautiful woman,” and Vogel writes in the stage directions that “Li’l Bit looks up, blushes,” 
while Peck photographs her in view of the audience (62). A few photographs later, Li’l Bit tells 
Peck that “the boys in school don’t think,” that she is beautiful and Peck reassures her saying, 
“it’s gonna take them a while to catch up” (62). As Peck “clicks another shot,” the audience sees 
“a faint smile on Li’l Bit on the screen” (62). Peck builds Li’l Bit’s self-confidence, then, even as 
he objectifies her.  
Because this objectification  makes Li’l Bit aware of what Dolan writes as “a budding 
sexuality that’s powerful,” Li’l Bit must quickly determine how and when to incorporate this 
power into her life away from Peck. Once Li’l Bit begins to understand Peck’s process of 
objectification then, she also learns to recycle objectification into a form of insulation. In the 
scene leading into the photo shoot, Li’l Bit stands against a wall during a school Sock Hop while 
Uncle Peck “stands and stares at [her] body” in a “strange light [while] setting up a tripod” (55). 
In the stage directions, Vogel writes that Li’l Bit “tenses, aware of Peck’s gaze” (56). When a 
classmate, Greg, asks her to dance, however, Li’l Bit turns Peck’s gaze on herself. She tells 
another girl from her school, “I think he asks me on the fast dances so that he can watch 
me…jiggle” (56). By learning to think “five steps ahead” of her Uncle then, Li’l Bit has also 
learned to think several steps ahead of the “Neanderthals” in the gymnasium (62). In this sense, 
Peck’s objectification has given her some sense of self-protection by teaching her to anticipate 
the motives of men who ask her to dance with (or for) them13. 
 
13 Li’l Bit’s perceived sense of self-protection is different from her vulnerability. To argue otherwise—to argue, in 
other words, that Li’l Bit could protect herself from sexual violence by regulating how men objectify her—follows 
the same logic as the argument that women can protect themselves from rape by changing their clothes. 
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When Li’l Bit begins to sort through her confusion over this objectification and self-
protection with her classmate, however, she imaginatively reconstructs her body as a site of both 
power and vulnerability. She tells the teenage Greek chorus, “Sometimes I feel like these alien 
life forces, these two mounds of flesh have grafted themselves onto my chest, and they’re using 
me until they can ‘propagate’ and take over the world and they’ll just keep growing…until I 
collapse under their weight and they suck all the nourishment out of my body” (57). A moment 
later however, the metaphor changes and she says, “Maybe someone’s implanted radio 
transmitters in my chest at a frequency I can’t hear, that girls can’t detect, but they’re sending out 
signals to men who get mesmerized, like sirens, calling them to dash themselves on these rocks” 
(58). Joanna Mansbridge has noted that the two metaphors in the scene recall “the campy terror 
of 1950’s sci-fi films” (138). Because Li’l Bit is “both alienated from her body and shackled to 
what it signifies…she becomes, in these scenes, acutely aware that her body is not entirely hers, 
but the property of a cold and unfriendly culture” (138-9). In this sense, the very alienation that 
allows Li’l Bit to view herself through the lens of Peck’s camera, also requires her to replicate 
her Uncle’s misogyny by continually compelling her to read her body as a cultural object. 
As a result of this replication, Li’l Bit often divorces herself from the immediacy of 
bodied experience in order to outthink the “cold and unfriendly culture” of men who objectify 
her. Throughout the play, Vogel traces this bodily alienation through imagery of flight to signify 
both the security of escape and the bodily alienation in escapism. In her final monologue, for 
example, the adult Li’l Bit sits in Peck’s lap enduring the physical trauma of her uncle’s abuse 
while the teenage Greek chorus stands just outside the car “trying not to cry” and narrating the 
spoken exchanges with Peck (90). Once Peck and the teenage Greek chorus exit the stage, Li’l 
Bit steps out of the car, saying, “That was the last day I lived inside of my body. I retreated 
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above the neck, and I’ve lived in the fire in my head ever since” (90). Timothy McCracken and 
other critics have spoken of this retreat in the psychological language of “dissociation” though it 
is clear that Li’l Bit frames that emotional detachment in the less pathological language of 
empowerment (136). Li’l Bit tells the audience, “The nearest sensation I feel—of flight in the 
body—I guess I feel when I’m driving” (91). Moments later, Li’l Bit looks in the rear view 
mirror and “floor[s] it” (91) and there is a sense of authority in this flight that Peck has already 
anticipated in an earlier scene when he tells Li’l Bit that he wants to give her “something…that 
nobody can take from [her]. A power,” the power, perhaps, of a car accelerating into the sunset 
(Vogel 50). In her interview with Arthur Holmberg, Vogel would speak of the power, too, telling 
him that Li’l Bit “learns to move on” (436). 
Vogel’s imagery of flight however, is not consistently associated with embodied 
empowerment in Drive. When Li’l Bit tells the audience that she “retreated above the neck” to 
live in “the fire of [her] head,” she makes it clear that survival has been a process of not only 
intellectual strategy, but bodily alienation. By choosing not to dance with Greg, this retreat into 
her mind gives her some sense of insulation even as she continues to find herself alienated from 
the students in her class. As an adult, she describes a similar experience of alienation as she 
witnesses the physical activity of other people. She tells the audience, “I know I’m lucky. 
Although I still have never known what it feels like to jog or dance . . . I do like to watch people 
on the dance floor, or out on the running paths, just jiggling away” (91). Though Li’l Bit has 
found a powerful means of self-protection through self-objectification, in other words, that 
alienation also manifests in her reluctance to occupy her body in all of its physical power.  
Ultimately, this self-protective bodily retreat also begins to threaten her very existence. 
Vogel, of course, makes it clear that many of Li’l Bit’s family members have a similar history of 
41 
conflict aversion and retreat. As I discuss in chapter one, Li’l Bit’s Grandmother once retreated 
from the emotional discomfort of a parent-child sex talk by sending Lucy to a priest for sexual 
education. After Li’l Bit was born, Li’l Bit’s father retreated from his wife and child and Li’l Bit 
began her relationship with Peck in the shadow of this family history. Peck, however—who Aunt 
Mary tells us is “so good with [girls] when they get to be [Li’l Bit’s] age—also retreats from 
emotional discomfort even as he offers sincere emotional sensitivity to his niece (19). One 
Christmas Eve, Peck confesses to a “fire in his heart” that leaves him to contend with such 
emotional turmoil that he numbs himself to reality with alcohol (70). There are not, as Aunt 
Mary tells the audience, “rap sessions,” for men to speak about combat trauma and Peck has 
resigned himself to this logic and speculation so thoroughly that he is willing to let a thirteen-
year old girl play his AA sponsor. Ultimately, he trades alcoholism for sexual abuse, retreating 
from one method of flight to another. In Li’l Bit’s memories of her uncle, she consistently frames 
his abuse and alcoholism in this flight imagery. 
During the moments after Li’l Bit refuses Peck’s marriage proposal, she imaginatively 
reconstructs his breakdown by drawing on the tension between emotional evasion and emotional 
support. The stage directions read, “We see Peck sitting, carefully and calmly downing shot 
glasses,” while Li’l Bit says, “I never saw him again. I stayed away from Christmas and 
Thanksgiving for years after (85). It took my Uncle seven years to drink himself to death. First 
he lost his job, then his wife, and finally his driver’s license” (85). Peck has lost, in other words, 
the very power of flight that he worked so hard to give to Li’l Bit in their driving lessons 
together. As Li’l Bit talks about her uncle’s escape plan, Vogel returns to the language of 
“retreat” once again, but—this time—she frames flight imagery in Peck’s alcoholism. Li’l Bit 
tells the audience, “He retreated to his house, and had his bottles delivered. One night he tried to 
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go downstairs to the basement—and he flew down the steep basement steps” (85). In this 
moment, she reimagines him as an emblem of American masculinity just as she recognizes that 
this version of masculinity is a social construct. The stage directions read, “Peck stands, and puts 
his hands in front of him—almost like Superman flying,” (85). One moment, Peck is at the top of 
the staircase, Man of Steel, flying-higher-than-any-airplane. The next moment, he is a “very 
ordinary men” at the base of a flight of stairs (29) “steps away from his dark room” (85).  
Li’l Bit then begins to look at Peck’s other form of escapism and her metaphor shifts 
again just as it did when she was fifteen at the Sock Hop. She asks, ‘Who did it to you, Uncle 
Peck? How old were you? Were you eleven?” The imagery softens. She tells the audience, 
“Sometimes I think of my uncle as a kind of Flying Dutchman. In the opera, the Dutchman is 
doomed to wander the sea; but every seven years he can come ashore, and if he finds a maiden 
who will love him of her own free will—he will be released” (86). In this imagery, Li’l Bit re-
writes Peck’s flight with a kind of sympathetic fatalism for the “fire in his heart,” that he tells her 
that he has struggled to put out. But Li’l Bit is not merely making excuses for Peck’s apparent 
entitlement to sexual encounters with children; she is also gesturing toward the opera’s ending. 
In Wagner’s work, The Flying Dutchman is only ever released from his curse after his beloved 
takes her own life in order to be with him. Fearing the maiden’s betrayal in his final moments 
ashore, he returns to his ghostly vessel and begins to ascend into the clouds. His beloved, in 
desperation, throws herself from the cliff then ascends with him into heaven as a ghost. Her body 
is lost in the sea. In order to love Peck of her own free will, Li’l Bit must make a similar decision 
between ascent and descent, but that ascent—that loyalty to Peck—will require her to relinquish 
her own claims to survival.  
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For Li’l Bit, the imagery of flight in her own life is forever bound up in this tension 
between outright emotional evasion and emotional evasion as a means of survival. To unite with 
her Flying Dutchman, then, Li’l Bit must abandon subjectivity in exchange for the objectified 
Li’l Bit of Peck’s imagination. As I mentioned in chapter one, Vogel especially uses objectifying 
language in her comparisons between Li’l Bit and the automobiles she drives and, for much of 
the play, Li’l Bit is content with her uncle’s objectification and with living outside of her body. 
When she asks her uncle why his car is “ a she,” he tells her, “When you close your eyes and 
think of someone who responds to your touch—someone who performs just for you and gives 
you what you ask for—I guess I always see a “she” (51). Li’l Bit agrees with him, saying, “I 
closed my eyes—and decided not to change the gender” (51).  
Though Li’l Bit will ultimately outgrow Peck, she is not as quick to outgrow his methods 
of flight and retreat as she finds herself taking on other objects of control in the performative 
position of the Dutchman. On a bus ride upstate, for example, she turns an objectifying gaze onto 
a “young man,” with “huge ears at a defiant angle, and she thinks five steps ahead of him (40). 
Just as she once learned from Peck how to “perform just for [him],” she now treats the 
objectification as a kind of performance, framing their sexual encounter in theatrical language 
(51). She tells the audience, “There was the briefest of intermissions and an extremely capable 
and forceful and sustained second act” (441). After the “general denouement,” however, Li’l Bit 
makes it clear that her motives were more emotional and intellectual than physical, saying, “I lay 
on my back in the dark and I thought about you, Uncle Peck . . . this is how the giver gets taken” 
(41).  
Li’l Bit, however, does not only replicate Peck’s abusive sexual behavior, but his 
alcoholism as well. When she tells the audience that “most nights” she “cruise[d] the back roads 
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of Maryland..in a 1965 Mustang….[fully tanked]” with “gasoline for [her] car and whiskey for 
[her],” Vogel points back to the flight-as-power and flight-as-escape imagery that she has 
touched upon in earlier scenes by conflating the two meanings of “tanked” (21). L’il Bit has both 
enough gas in her car to keep her on the road for a few hours and enough alcohol in her body to 
numb her to her own emotions. Li’l Bit, then, drinks and drives to escape the reality of her 
emotional discomfort and pain. Though she credits Peck for her survival saying, “I never got so 
much as a ticket. He taught me well,” Vogel looks to the example of Peck’s own death to 
indicate that Peck’s methods of flight are not really meant for long-term strategies of survival. 
Li’l Bit nearly succumbs to the same fate as Peck, while speeding “past the churches and trees on 
the bend, thinking just one notch of the steering wheel would be all it would take” (21).  
Though Li’l Bit survives Peck, then, she also loses nearly every outside source of 
autonomy in her life. Regardless of how many times her uncle disrupts Big Papa’s dinner table, 
anti-education assertion that Li’l Bit has “all the credentials she needs [to succeed] on her chest,” 
it is clear that his own objectification of his niece nearly costs her her time in the classroom. 
Regardless of what Peck teaches Li’l Bit about “get[ting] away from” her family and going to 
school (19), her objectification—her inability to fully occupy her body in the present tense—
directly compromises her plan to “rise above [her] cracker background” (17). Whatever Peck has 
been teaching her about living in the fire of her mind, it is clear that he really only endorses her 
intellect insofar as it grants him access to her body. In view of this mind-body split, Li’l Bit 
learns, from Peck, not an endurance of trauma, but a flexibility towards it. Working in the 
shadow of gendered spaces, Li’l Bit finds a (dorm) room of her own in order to process her 
relationship with her uncle where she learns—not how to overcome abuse, but how to remove 
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herself from it. Once she is finally able to look beyond her position as an object of Peck’s 
imagination, she turns the flight he taught her against him.  
After inviting him to a hotel room on her eighteenth birthday, she downs several glasses 
of champagne to steady her nerves. She encourages him to have a drink, too, by recycling his 
language from their visit to the inn years before. At sixteen, he told the waiter that “the lady” at 
his table wanted a drink (25), and, at eighteen, she tells him that it is “not polite to let a lady 
drink alone” (77). Li’l Bit, though, isn’t just recycling Peck’s language but her own methods of 
conflict resolution as well. In the course of their evening outside of the inn, Li’l Bit once took 
advantage of her own intoxication to speak more directly to her uncle about the moral 
implications of their relationship. While struggling to think coherently, she tells him with some 
lucidity that “It isn’t nice [what they’re doing to] Aunt Mary” and Peck abruptly retreats from 
this conversation by saying, “You let me decide what is or isn’t nice to my wife” (31).  
As an adult, Li’l Bit “doesn’t want to do what she has to,” as Vogel writes in the stage 
directions, and she turns to Peck to ask for another glass of champagne. Two glasses later, she 
finally does what she “doesn’t want to do,” by telling Peck, “I don’t want to see you anymore” 
(80). Here, Peck “downs this rest of his champagne” and Vogel makes the differences between 
student and teacher clear (80). While Peck only ever learns to use alcohol as a means of 
temporarily escaping confrontation, Li’l Bit learns to use alcohol in order to work through the 
pain of confrontation itself. Peck, as an alcoholic and a pedophile never makes the choice that 
Li’l Bit does. As Andrew Kimbrough explains, “As an adult L'il Bit has come to learn that the 
cycle of deferred responsibility and denial of complicity has got to be broken. Her well-being 
dictates that she must escape the trap of blaming and scapegoating another for her own mistakes 
and misdeeds, no matter how excusable they may seem” (57). By merely replicating Peck’s 
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behavior, in other words, Li’l Bit nearly succumbs to Peck’s demise, but—by using Peck’s 
escapism to her advantage—she finds a means of escaping him. 
A moment later, Peck attempts to negotiate with her again and Li’l Bit finds a means of 
escaping the cycle a second time. Peck says to her, “Before you say anything else. I want the 
chance to . . . hold you. Because sometimes the body knows things that the mind isn't listening 
to” (81). Li’l Bit’s body is not yet, of course, so alien to her that she feels nothing for her uncle at 
all in that moment. As she joins him on the bed, Vogel writes that she “starts to lower herself to 
kiss him—then wrenches herself free” (83). She tells him, “I have to go” and he asks, “Didn’t 
you feel anything?” She lies, saying, “No nothing” (83). Suddenly, Peck pulls a ring box from 
his pocket, saying, “I want you to be my wife,” and Li’l Bit says, “This isn’t happening” (84). 
She has, of course, used this language before when Peck touched her for the first time, but she is 
no longer trapped in her uncle’s lap. She flies across the room, telling him “family is family,” 
before grabbing her coat to leave. Her retreat into her mind, in other words, has enabled her to 
leave him and her replication of bodily alienation given her her freedom.  
To return to Robin James’ language, then, Peck objectifies Li’l Bit until she learns to 
“perform just for him” (51). In the context of that performance, however, Li’l Bit must abandon 
any claim to her own subjectivity by rejecting the immediacy of her bodied experiences. In order 
to leave Peck and to use “damage as a resource” for subjectification, Li’l cannot merely replicate 
this bodily alienation without also replicating the power structures that she has inherited from 
Peck. As an object of Peck’s imagination, Li’l Bit succumbs to both sexual perpetration and 
alcoholism. When she finally chooses to lay claim to her own subjectivity through Peck’s abuse, 
she subverts the inheritance of bodily alienation in order to destroy him. With regard to the 
questions I raised at the beginning of this essay, then, Peck has not, as Bigsby conjectures 
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“forged [Li’l Bit] into a weapon against himself,” since Peck is quite capable of destroying his 
life all by himself” (324). Peck has “not . . . intentionally taught [Li’l Bit] how to reject him,” as 
Hull speculates, because Peck himself has no strategy for self-protection that is not also self-
destruction. (40)  
Peck has proven himself incapable of the kind of independence through which Li’l Bit 
makes a life for herself without him. Vogel writes that Peck “lies down on the bed for a moment, 
trying to absorb the terrible news” and he “almost curls into a fetal position” (85). When Peck 
encounters emotional pain, he resigns himself to alcoholic numbness rather than confrontation. 
When he registers that his “body knows things that [his] mind isn’t listening to,” he resigns 
himself to the perpetration of sexual violence (138). By presenting Peck as a fetus in the stage 
directions, Vogel makes it clear that Li’l Bit has found her independence from him just as he has 
discovered his dependency upon her. He has only ever learned to endure pain by separating body 
and mind with alcohol or sex, while Li’l Bit has learned to separate body and mind in order to 
reject him. As Li’l Bit prepares to do so, he “stands upright” from the bed “with a discipline that 
comes from being told that boys don’t cry” (85). He mimics Li’l Bit’s behavior in other words, 
but never manages to subvert bodily alienation into any means of longer-term emotional 
regulation. Over the next several years, he will drink himself to death. 
Just as Robin James concludes in her writings on feminist resilience narratives, the mere 
replication of patriarchal power dynamics “reinforces and strengthens patriarchy,” so that—in 
Vogel’s play—Li’l Bit comes to turn Peck’s power against her own body. Peck, too, in this final 
scene turns his own destructive masculinity standards against his own body even to the point of 
death. Ultimately then, Li’l Bit proves herself a far more eager and capable student than her 
uncle is a teacher with all of his misinformation and in, returning to Jill Dolan’s writings on 
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theater and hope, I hope that this essay foregrounds Li’l Bit’s creativity and survival, instead of 
her Uncle’s moral equivocations. 
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4 CONCLUSION 
In Witnessing Girlhood, feminist theorists Leigh Gilmore and Elizabeth Marshall begin 
their examination of the intersection between life writing and girlhood studies by reflecting—as I 
have in the previous three chapters—on the trial of Larry Nassar. Gilmore and Marshall observe 
that Nassar’s victims “exposed how practices of discrediting girls and young women coincide 
with a narrative of protecting, even caring for, children” while “shield[ing] a sexual predator 
from exposure and prosecution” (2). The authors go on to examine a “long tradition” in which 
“adult women return to the experience of their own girlhoods” “to offer fine-grained and 
strategically shaped accounts of childhood that allow new audiences to understand their 
vulnerability and suffering, but also the role that authorities played in enabling violence” (2). As 
I conclude this thesis, I draw from Gilmore’s and Marshall’s analysis of Una’s graphic novel 
Becoming Unbecoming as a means of examining Li’l Bit’s ethical positioning in simultaneous 
temporalities of childhood and adulthood.  
Una, as the authors summarize, is “a pen name meaning ‘one, one life, one of many’ 
taken by a feminist academic and comics artist living in the UK” (Gilmore and Marshall 75). In 
Becoming Unbecoming, Una represents one life in two temporalities by drawing herself as a 
child while narrating her experiences of girlhood sexual violence through the speech bubbles of 
an older adult self. At the start of the novel, Una draws herself as a little girl, carrying an empty 
speech bubble up a hill without, as Linda Alcoff has put it, “the language to name what [has] 
happened” to her (25). In a later drawing, however, she begins to provide an adult’s speech and 
insight for her childhood experiences by “repurpos[ing] material artifacts of girlhood for 
dissonant affective purposes” (Gilmore and Marshall 75).  In one drawing, she deconstructs 
what-were-you-wearing police interrogations by recreating the clothing in which she was 
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sexually assaulted as a two-dimensional outfit for a paper doll. Below the paper doll clothing, 
two voices narrate components of her experience in speech bubbles. Her rapist tells her, “It’d be 
a lot easier next time if you wore a skirt” and an older Una—in reflective disbelief—says in 
another bubble, “Yes, that is actually what he said” (83). In a footnote to this bubble, another 
still-older Una explains to her presumed audience, “I have not used the word rape to describe 
this incident, even though that is what it was. This was because I didn’t name it as rape until 
many years later” (83). That adult reflection echoes Linda Alcoff’s explanation that “the word 
rape wasn’t in [her] vocabulary” as a nine-year old girl (83).  
 In Drive, Li’l Bit ends her narrative in a similar way, reflecting—as a thirty-five year 
old—on her experience as an eleven-year old. As in the work of Alcoff and Una, Li’l Bit’s “adult 
voice accompanies [a] younger self to verify the perspective of the child witness” (Gilmore and 
Marshall 83). This double-representation, however, is not symbolic of a division, but of “one 
life, one of many” (75). In chapter one, I discussed how critics have come to separate Li’l Bit’s 
younger self from her older self in examining the backwards-moving chronology of Peck’s 
abuse. That division is not always explicit in criticism even though it often entails an implicit 
privileging of Li’l Bit’s older adolescent experiences over her younger adolescent experiences. 
To that end, Andrew Kimbrough has modeled Peck’s and Li’l Bit’s encounters on other cultural 
paradigms of May-December romances, writing that “except for the early instance of 
molestation,” the relationship mirrors the “real life example of Woody Allen and Soon Yi 
Previn” (51).  
Over the course of this thesis, I argue that we cannot make such exceptions for Peck’s 
later encounters with Li’l Bit, given his initial encounter with her. We cannot, in other words, 
separate “the early instance of molestation,” from the later instances of molestation even if Li’l 
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Bit frames her portrait of Peck with empathy, and even if she finds some emotional security in 
their relationship. By contextualizing Li’l Bit’s later encounters in her earlier encounters, I argue 
that her dependency upon Peck for sexual, legal, and emotional guidance throughout her 
adolescence means that she is exempt from ethical analyses of complicity. Furthermore, by 
framing the text in Kennedy’s writings on adolescent identity formation and Kutz’s writings on 
adult-child, subject-object relationships, I provide a more general basis for the legitimacy of 
consent laws as “products of social evolution” rather than mere “indicat[ors] of our own 
discomforts” (Kennedy 50).  
In chapter two, I evaluate Li’l Bit’s transition from victim of trauma to survivor of 
trauma. My aim, in making these cultural distinctions, is not to separate components of Li’l Bit’s 
identity by age or experience, since—as I have pointed out in chapter one—Li’l Bit’s self is one 
of many. Instead, I frame Li’l Bits survival in Robin James’ writings on “damage as [a] 
resource” for overcoming trauma in order to demonstrate how Li’l Bit frees herself from Peck by 
turning his lessons of bodily-alienation against him. In doing so, I evaluate how Li’l Bit survives 
in spite of Peck’s teaching, not because of it. While Peck certainly offers her other lessons by 
encouraging her to take her life into her own hands then, I argue that he grounds these lessons in 
a pull-yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps logic of choiceless choices between, in at least one 
instance, sexual abuse and death. Ultimately, Li’l Bit outsmarts Peck by learning, not just how to 
protect herself in the short-term, but how to protect herself in the long-term by reordering the 
language of Peck’s speech bubbles. While Peck teaches Li’l Bit emotional numbness then, she 
also sees that numbness as an anesthetic, a means to an end goal rather than a means for merely 
coping with the present. 
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In returning to Una’s image of a child climbing a hill under the weight of an empty 
speech bubble then, we are long overdue for an analysis of complicity and blame in Drive 
without the additional burden of ethically-chaotic critical footnotes. In concluding this project, I 
hope that we can begin to challenge some of the implications that critics have made about Li’l 
Bit and her survival and about Peck and his serial victimization of children with regard to the 
vacillating power dynamics in their relationship. I hope that we can also begin to interrogate how 
Peck’s position as guardian of Li’l Bit’s emotional security renders him both her protector and 
her overseer and it is through our refusal to reconcile these two positions of power that we 
perpetuate rape culture. Like his niece, Peck has the capacity to both protect and harm just as Li’l 
Bit has the capacity to feel both safe and frightened in his presence. Neither position should 
cancel out the other. In making that critical cancellation, we not only add our own speech to 
bubbles already overcrowded with the language of perpetrators of sexual violence, we add to the 
traumatic burden of those figures like Una, still climbing up-hill.  
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